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 Chapter 10 
 Migration and Development Framework 
and Its Links to Integration 
 Russell  King and  Michael  Collyer 
 Introduction 
 Both historically and still today, migration is driven by economics. One of 
Ravenstein’s famous laws of migration went simply thus: ‘The major causes of 
migration are economic’. 1 Whilst it is true, in this late-modern era, that people 
migrate for a greater diversity of reasons, including education, lifestyle, love, or a 
warmer climate, the primacy of “economic migration” remains, not least in political 
discourse and in discussions over how migration should be managed. In the UK, for 
instance, the term “economic migrants”, said with emphasis on the “economic”, is 
applied to people whose infl ux should be rigidly controlled, even suppressed, except 
when there is an anticipated benefi t to the economy, as in the aftermath of European 
Union (EU) enlargement in 2004. 2 
 This continuous stress on migration as a fundamentally economic process is an 
enduring explanation of  why most migration takes place (to escape poverty and 
unemployment, to improve incomes and life-chances, etc.), but it says very little 
about the  effects of migration, especially on the countries, regions, and communities 
of origin of the migrants, and on their family members left behind. The economic 
1  Ravenstein’s original papers were published in  1885 and  1889 . For an accessible and sympathetic 
critique see Grigg ( 1977 ). 
2 After the 2004 enlargement, the UK, Ireland, and Sweden immediately opened their labour mar-
kets to the entry of workers from the ten accession countries. A much larger infl ux than expected 
took place, especially of Poles to the UK and Ireland. Nevertheless, these labour migrants helped 
to underpin the economic boom that lasted until the 2008 fi nancial crisis. For an in-depth analysis 
of this East–west development-inducing migration, see Black et al. ( 2010 ), Galgoczi et al. ( 2009 ), 
and Glorius et al. ( 2013 ). 
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frame of reference, with its emphasis on (un)employment, incomes, and labour 
 markets, says even less about other important dimensions of migration, such as 
migrants’ social integration in the host country and what this, in turn, might mean 
for their relationship with their home country. 
 The connection between the succinct interpretation of integration set out by 
Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas in Chap.  2 of this volume (on the process of 
becoming an accepted part of society) and the predominantly economic understand-
ing of migration and development is not always clear. One of our central arguments 
in this chapter is that the overall approach to migration and development in both 
applied and theoretical terms has fl uctuated with different understandings of the 
nature, forms, and processes of integration. We follow other theoretical overviews 
of migration and development in characterizing this relationship as a swinging pen-
dulum (De Haas  2012 ; Gamlen  2014 ). 
 We fi rst look at how the relationship between migration and development (hence-
forth M&D) has been seen theoretically, tracing how this analysis has swung 
between positive and negative interpretations over the seven decades of the European 
post-war era. Throughout this historical-theoretical treatment, we privilege three 
processes as potential triggers of home-country development: remittances, return 
migration, and diaspora involvement. We then broaden the dual conceptual lens of 
M&D: we refocus migration and return as encompassing a diversity of transnational 
mobilities; we reconceptualize development as being less about economic measures 
and more about human wellbeing; and we broaden our analysis of remittances from 
fi nancial transfers to include social, cultural, and political elements. The fi nal part 
of the chapter aims at a synthesis between the M&D frame, on the one hand, and the 
integration frame, on the other. Here, we ask two questions. First, how does the 
multifaceted integration process impact on migrants’ capacity to stimulate develop-
ment in their home countries and communities? Second, for those migrants who 
return-migrate or who lead multi-sited transnational lives, what are the challenges 
to their reintegration in their countries of origin? 
 Theoretical Perspectives on the M&D Nexus 
 Any social scientist with a contemporary global perspective will surely agree that 
the phenomenon of migration and the challenge of development are vigorously 
debated topics. How do these two mega-processes interface with each other? We 
start with defi nitions and move to theory. Bakewell ( 2012 : xiv) contrasts ‘solid’ 
migration with ‘slippery’ development. 
 Migration is observable and measurable, despite the invisibility of clandestine 
migration and the challenges of collecting good migration statistics. The global 
 stock of migrants—people residing in a country different from their birth country—
stands at 232 million, 3.3% of the world’s population of 7.2 billion (UN  2013 ). But 
stock fi gures are static measures; they refl ect the culmination of previous 
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 migrations. Given that both migration and development are dynamic processes, 
 fl ows of migrants are often seen as the more relevant variable—either one-way or 
net fl ows over a certain time span, such as a year or a decade. The notion of net 
migration, intuitively attractive in the gravitational logic of economic push and pull 
factors, is problematic, however, as it is the residual product of fi ve types of migra-
tion fl ows: emigrants going out of a country, and those returning; immigrants com-
ing into a country, and those returning; and fi nally, transit migrants passing through. 
Moreover, if migration is seen as the product of individual human decision-making 
events, then it has to be pointed out that there is no such individual as a net migrant! 
Fischer et al. ( 1997 : 94–96) engage in a simple but interesting correlation analysis 
between the “net stock” of migration for each country (the balance between that 
country’s immigrants and its emigrants, expressed as a percentage of total popula-
tion) and the “dependant” variable of development (gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita measured in purchasing power parities). For the world as a whole, the 
correlation is +0.46. Overall, then, the more immigrants the higher the GDP, and the 
more emigration the lower the GDP. 3 
 Compared to “solid” migration, the conceptualization and measurement of 
development are contentious, with a diversity of perspectives. Bakewell ( 2012 : xiv–
xvi) notes two older ideas of development. The fi rst is the European Enlightenment 
belief in the capacity of humanity to progress towards a stable and rational social 
and economic order, which implies a duty of “advanced” countries to help and “civ-
ilize” the “unenlightened” parts of the world. In practice, this was no more than a 
‘moral cover for colonial expansion’ (ibid.). Second, the mid-twentieth-century col-
lapse of colonial empires, combined with the Cold War, set the frame for an ideo-
logical battle between, on the one side, the West’s policy of “development” as 
modernization and economic growth within the capitalist global order and, on the 
other, the heterogeneous communist or socialist ideas about development espoused 
by the Soviet bloc, China, Cuba, etc. We return to this ideological duel presently. 
 Over time, narrowly  economic interpretations of development (i.e., economic 
growth measured in trends in GDP per capita as the magical indicator) broadened to 
a wider vision of  human development. This is now well established (since 1990) in 
the Human Development Index used in successive annual reports of the United 
Nations Development Programme to synthesize, alongside per capita GDP, quality- 
of- life variables like literacy, health, life expectancy, infant mortality, human rights, 
and gender equality into composite indices. Such measures take their cue from 
Sen’s ( 1999 ) pioneering work on reconceptualizing development as the capacity of 
people to exercise autonomy and control over their lives. 
3  The correlations are higher when the analysis is applied to groupings of countries linked by 
regional immigration systems: +0.81 for Europe, Turkey, and the Maghreb and +0.73 for the 
Americas (Fischer et al.  1997 , 95). 
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 Migration Studies and Development Studies 
 Until relatively recently the two interdisciplinary fi elds of migration studies and 
development studies remained separate: migration scholars said little about devel-
opment, and development specialists said little about migration. Policy debates like-
wise were kept largely separate. Some signifi cant forays were made into the 
interlinkages, at both the local-regional level (Abadan-Unat et al.  1976 ) and on a 
more global scale (Skeldon  1997 ; Zelinsky  1971 ), but little attempt was made at 
formal theorization of the relationship. 
 For most of the post-war period until the early 1990s, the predominant European 
discourse focused on labour-market needs, “guest worker” immigration, and “integra-
tion”. There was almost no acknowledgement of migrants’ links to their home coun-
tries and their developmental impact there. There was, however, an implicit assumption 
that migration would be benefi cial to migrants’ home countries through savings and 
remittances sent back, and through the innovative stimulus of return migration. 
However, several studies carried out in various return-destination contexts in the 1970s 
and 1980s found this return-development mechanism to be largely lacking. 4 What was 
clear then, and what has emerged with renewed clarity as a result of the westward 
migration of Poles and other accession-country migrants since 2004, is the develop-
mental contribution of labour migration to the receiving country, the continued growth 
of which was sustained and accelerated by extra supplies of fl exible and willing labour. 
Both the guest worker migration and the recent East–west migration vindicate Piore’s 
( 1979 ) thesis on the crucial role of migrant labour in fuelling growth in advanced 
industrial economies. Indeed Castles and Kosack ( 1973 , 8), in their classic treatise on 
immigrant workers in Western Europe, go so far as to say that labour migration was a 
form of development aid given by the poor to the rich countries of Europe. 
 The nature of the M&D debate changed around 2000, prompted by a constella-
tion of changing migration contexts, new policy initiatives, and an academic reap-
praisal of what came to be called the migration–development nexus (Van Hear and 
Sørensen  2002 ). This substantial change can be framed in terms of the three distinct 
levels set out in Chap.  2 —individuals, organizations, and institutions—plus a fourth 
factor, which is the theoretical shift in keeping with empirical fi ndings and political 
developments.  First, at the individual and human-behaviour level, there was a clear 
understanding that global migration accelerated, globalized, and diversifi ed after 
the 1980s, through the era that Castles and Miller ( 2008 ) refer to as the ‘Age of 
Migration’. Beyond the classic “guest worker” origins in Southern Europe and the 
Maghreb, migrants were now arriving in Europe from a far wider geographical 
spread of source countries. The destinations in Europe shifted too, expanding from 
the “fi rst generation” of North-Western European receiving countries to include 
new “second-generation” immigration countries (the southern EU countries plus 
Ireland). This new immigration wave received fresh impetus after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and the subsequent eastward expansion of the EU. 
4  See, amongst others, the results of the REMPLOD project in Turkey (Abadan-Unat et al.  1976 ), 
research by Cerase ( 1974 ) and King et al. ( 1986 ) on Southern Italy, and by Rhodes ( 1978 ) on Spain. 
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 Second , at the organizational level, there was recognition that the way migrants 
are organized was signifi cant. The various forms that migrant collectives took, par-
ticularly hometown associations, underlined the importance of forms of integration 
in  both the origin and the destination country. Portes’ ( 1998 ) notion of “globaliza-
tion from below” highlights the existence of grassroots networks of migrants, con-
nected transnationally. The effectiveness of these organizations was dependent on 
their ability to “be accepted” as parts of two societies, as globally networked citi-
zens with access to key expertise in their countries of destination and as purveyors 
of international fi nancial support in their communities of origin (Lacroix  2005 ). In 
many cases, the societies in which migrants were accepted were highly localized. At 
the national level their presence was challenged in both origin and destination; 
acceptance came in villages of origin and professional networks in destination 
countries. 
 Third, at the institutional level, there were several new initiatives at the interna-
tional policy and political level. Countries of migrant origin were accepted as part-
ners or were drawn into debates on the international management of migration 
through such arenas as the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the High- 
Level UN Dialogues on Migration, and the increasing recognition of migration’s 
developmental potential in EU policy documents. 5 A parallel developmentalist 
thrust was prominent in publications emanating from the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) and the UNDP, notably the latter’s Human Development 
Report for 2009, entitled  Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development 
(UNDP  2009 ). Meanwhile the IOM’s  2013 World Migration Report also focuses on 
migration and development as its main theme (IOM  2013 ). Another aspect of the 
changing political context is the pressure coming from some European countries for 
the return or repatriation of migrants, especially those deemed “illegal”. Part of the 
justifi cation for this pressure for return is cloaked in a rhetoric of contributions to 
home-country development. The spread of assisted voluntary return programmes is 
a clear indication of this development. 
 Finally , from a theoretical perspective , publication of the collection of papers 
edited by Van Hear and Sørensen ( 2002 ) on the migration–development nexus refo-
cused the academic debate, highlighting in particular the role of remittances in 
stimulating home-country development. This is consistent with a more “bottom-up” 
view of migration and development, drawing on the “new economics” of labour 
migration, which foregrounds migration as a family or household decision leading 
to the temporary or circulating absence of key workers to generate remittances and 
investment for the homeland-based residual household or extended family, both for 
5  The European Commission’s fi rst Communication on Migration and Development was published 
in 2002 (COM ( 2002 ) 703 fi nal) and presented development as little more than a means of migra-
tion control. This had changed by the next Communication in 2005 (COM ( 2005 ) 390 fi nal) (see 
Collyer  2011 ). The most recent Commission paper,  Maximising the Development Impact of 
Migration , published in October 2013 (COM ( 2013 ) 292 fi nal), marks a further step-change in EU 
discourse. It focuses on internal migration, the impact of climate change, country-of-origin per-
spectives, and the mobility turn, amongst other things, and is framed by a discourse on the rights 
of migrants. This is not to say that this change is refl ected in EU practice, but it marks an important 
shift in emphasis of the political dialogue, which is now radically different from a decade earlier. 
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its survival and growth, and as a risk-averting hedge against unforeseen “market 
failures” such as a crop wipe-out (Taylor  1999 ). 
 Unpacking the M&D Nexus 
 We identify two diagrammatic representations of the M&D relationship, the second 
of which substitutes “underdevelopment” for “development”. Figure  10.1 sets these 
out as two simple causal models. The questions are easy to pose but diffi cult to 
answer given confl icting ideological and theoretical stances and a lack of consis-
tency across the mountain of empirical evidence that exists. So, does migration 
stimulate development; or is the causal link the reverse, with development leading 
to migration? Or is the relationship recursive, leading to a virtuous circle? Taking 
the alternative model, does underdevelopment produce migration; or does migration 
lead to underdevelopment? Or do they reproduce each other, this time in a vicious 
cycle? When we talk about development, who or what is experiencing this? The 
receiving society, the sending society, the migrants themselves—or all three in the 
aspired-for “triple-win” scenario? Are these hypothesized relationships stable over 
time, or are they likely to change according to historical context as well as the geo-
graphical setting and scale of analysis (e.g., household, community, nation)? 
Castles’ ( 2009 ) view is that simple one-way causality is impossible to infer, and that 
both migration and (under)development are part of the same interactive process, 
which he labels “global social transformation” (Castles  2010 ). This argument, at 
one level, is persuasive and probably true, but at another level it is perhaps too glib, 
allowing us to opt out of asking and responding to certain realist questions. Such 
questions refl ect the fact that migration is not necessarily a continuous and stable 
process (and nor is development). Many migration events occur with particular 
intensity in certain places, at certain times, and under certain conditions, such as 
economic crisis, civil strife, and environmental stress. Four questions seem particu-
larly relevant, bearing in mind that our primary focus in this chapter is on migration 
from poorer countries to richer ones.
 1.  Does underdevelopment cause outmigration? 
 2.  Does outmigration then lead to further underdevelopment? 
 3.  Or, does outmigration lead to development of the source areas? 
 4.  If outmigration leads to development of the source areas, does this development 






 Fig. 10.1  Migration and (under)development: two scenarios (Source: Authors) 
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 We feel that evidence exists to support a positive answer to the fi rst question. 
Studies from around the world have repeatedly shown that people migrate to escape 
poverty and other diffi cult life situations, although it is not necessarily the “poorest 
of the poor” who leave (De Haan  1999 ; Skeldon  2002 ). Contrasts also exist between 
those who see poverty migration as a voluntary act stimulated by the economic 
push-pull factors of unemployment and minimal incomes at home and better jobs 
and incomes abroad; and on the other hand, those who see this kind of migration as 
a forced move driven by the dictates of the globalized but segmented labour market 
supported by the predatory behaviour of corporate and individual employers. The 
question is, what happens next? If outmigration leads to further underdevelopment 
and impoverishment of the home area, then the vicious-cycle model applies. But if 
outmigration leads to the source area’s development through resource reallocation 
or the infl ow of vital remittances, then migration becomes an endogenous factor in 
development and we switch to the other, “virtuous” model. 
 The fi nal question in the set above begs two alternative answers. If development 
leads to reduced migration, then this is vindication of the “root causes” argument 
whereby, if a state of underdevelopment can be steered towards development, then 
the fundamental driver of outmigration will be removed. But this is far from the 
whole story, since evidence is accumulating that migration-led development can 
also stimulate further emigration through the demonstration effect (the success of 
some migrants tempts others to move) and the fact that, as a result of development, 
more people have access to the fi nancial resources and social networks necessary 
for successful emigration (De Haas  2007 ). The positive correlation between migra-
tion and development continues until such time as the country or region reaches a 
level of development whereby poverty-induced migration no longer occurs, thereby 
producing an inverted U-curve, labelled by Martin and Taylor ( 1996 ) as the “migra-





 Fig. 10.2  Migration and 
development: “root causes” 
versus “the hump” 
(Source: Adapted from 
Martin and Taylor ( 1996 )) 
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 Virtuous and Vicious Circles: Theoretical Underpinnings 
 Figure  10.1 portrays two simple models of the M&D relationship, representing 
respectively a virtuous and a vicious circle. The virtuous version relies on orthodox 
economic arguments but exhibits two variants, based in turn on neoclassical and 
“new” economics of migration. According to neoclassical equilibrium theory, peo-
ple make rational, well-informed calculations of the costs of, and returns to, migra-
tion (Sjaastad  1962 ). They migrate as individual decision-makers responding to 
differential wage rates, real incomes, and (un)employment rates in different regions 
or countries. They move from high-unemployment, low-wage economies to places 
where wages are signifi cantly higher (suffi ciently higher to discount the costs of 
migration) and jobs are widely available. By transferring labour from a high-supply, 
low-marginal-productivity country to one which has high demand and high marginal 
productivity of labour, migration increases aggregate economic welfare and eventu-
ally equalizes wage and employment differences through factor-price convergence. 
An equilibrium is reached, and migration ceases; the system is self- regulating and 
self-correcting. The developmental effects accrue especially to the destination coun-
try, which receives an extra supply of labour to boost growth (Borjas  1995 ). For the 
sending country, according to equilibrium theory, incomes should rise as the down-
ward pressure on wages wrought by an over-supply of labour is removed, and other 
resources—such as land and housing—are reallocated accordingly. The neoclassical 
model has its own internal economic logic, but is based on many unrealistic assump-
tions, including “perfect information” and no barriers to migration. It also “assumes 
away” the social context of families and kinship, and says nothing about integration. 
Under this model there is no return migration—returnees are simply “failures” who 
miscalculated the costs and benefi ts of their migration (Cassarino  2004 ). 
 Remittances are rarely mentioned in the neoclassical interpretation of M&D, but 
they are central to the new economics of labour migration (NELM) model (Taylor 
 1999 ). Still essentially an orthodox economic model, NELM shifts focus from the 
individual to the household and stresses migrants’ agency within the family setting. 
Moreover, migration takes place not just to maximize income from labour but to 
minimize the risk of “market failures” such as a natural disaster or a collapse in the 
price of a key product. Under the NELM model, one or more family members 
migrate (usually those whose labour power is most marketable abroad, such as a 
young male construction worker or a female domestic worker), leaving others 
behind to continue the household’s business (e.g., a small farm holding). In this way 
a portfolio of income and subsistence sources is created, cushioning the effects of a 
possible failure in one of the sources. Remittances are sent to support the residual 
family in the home country, and may be deployed in a variety of uses: setting up a 
new enterprise, educating young family members, or responding to an emergency 
(e.g., a drought or medical bills). Once the target is reached, return migration can 
take place—hence, under this model returnees are successes, not failures—although 
other household members may continue the tradition of migration in order to pre-
serve the fl ow of remittances. 
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 Completely opposite to the neoclassical and NELM visions of M&D is the 
vicious cycle interpretation. Drawing on Marxist political economy, historical- 
structuralism, the Latin American  Dependencia School (Frank  1969 ) and 
Wallerstein’s ( 1974 ) world systems theory, this framework sees migration between 
poor and rich countries as part of the “development of underdevelopment” in the 
economic periphery. Migrants are the pawns of global capitalism, part of capital’s 
search for a “reserve army” of cheap, exploitable, and expendable labour. Delgado 
Wise and Márquez Covarrubias ( 2011 ) view migration as integral to the reproduc-
tion of global and regional inequality and as reinforcing the structures of spatial 
uneven development. These authors see such labour transfers as forced migration 
between unequal partners (e.g., Mexico and the USA, Morocco and Europe) bound 
together in a system of profoundly asymmetric integration. Such migration contrib-
utes to the development of the advanced receiving society but impoverishes the 
already-poor sending country. Under this optic, migration is self-perpetuating, via 
mechanisms of cumulative causation, not self-correcting to an equilibrium state. 
Peripheral countries or regions in the global economic and geopolitical system are 
condemned to remain peripheral, their main function being to supply whatever raw 
materials (including labour) they have to the countries of the “core”. In this model, 
remittances and return migration do not feature as exogenous stimuli for develop-
ment. Remittances are argued to be largely “wasted” on housing and consumer 
goods, resulting in “modernization without development”, and return migration is 
said to bring back only the sick, the exhausted, and the retired. 
 Optimism, Pessimism, and the Neoliberal Agenda 
 The theoretical-ideological models outlined above have held sway in three alternat-
ing periods of more or less 20 years each. The optimism of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
decades of mass labour migration in Europe, was replaced by the pessimism of the 
1970s and 1980s. Renewed optimism came with the rise of the transnationalist and 
new economics paradigms in the academic study and policy framing of migration in 
the 1990s and 2000s. In two important papers, De Haas ( 2010 ,  2012 ) maps these 
swings of the “migration and development pendulum” as follows (see also Faist and 
Fauser  2011 ; Gamlen  2014 ). 
 The 1950s and 1960s saw economic reconstruction and industrial expansion in 
North-Western Europe. Labour migration transferred workers, initially temporary 
“guest workers”, from labour-surplus to labour-defi cit regions of Europe. Little 
attempt was made to integrate these migrant workers, since it was assumed that their 
stay would be temporary. True, they were economically integrated into the host 
country’s production system, but they were not encouraged to integrate socially and 
culturally, and they were given limited legal and civic rights. From a developmental 
perspective, the general view, at least on the part of many economists and 
 policymakers, was that this labour migration not only helped North-Western 
European economies to rebuild, industrialize, and modernize, but also upgraded 
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 living standards in the sending areas through rising wages, capital transfers (remit-
tances and some capital investments facilitated by low-cost labour and fi scal 
incentives), and re-skilled returnees (Kindleberger  1967 ). 
 Critical voices played down these achievements. They claimed that remittances 
failed to stimulate development beyond consumption and that returnees, who had 
mostly done menial jobs in factories and on construction sites, brought little rele-
vant knowledge and skills. Few returnees invested in viable enterprises that spawned 
economic multiplier effects, like creating new employment for the local economy 
(Böhning  1975 ). At the same time, it was noted that migrants had “failed” to inte-
grate largely because of the host society’s barriers of exclusion and racism (Castles 
and Kosack  1973 ). This pessimism widened to a more general critique of migration- 
led development after the oil crisis brought a halt to labour-migrant recruitment in 
Europe in 1973. Seers et al. ( 1979 ) applied the core–periphery model to the 
European case, the result being that “developmentalism” gave way to “dependency” 
and “underdevelopmentalism” as characterizations of the theoretical and empirical 
outcome of the post-oil crisis years. It was argued that emigration not only took 
away the youngest, fi ttest, and most ambitious of the less-educated workers from 
the peripheral regions, it also produced a brain drain of the more highly educated, 
leading to an overall decline in the periphery’s endowment of human capital. 
 During the 1990s the pendulum swung again, back towards the optimistic view 
of migration’s contribution to development. Both ideological shifts and a large vol-
ume of empirical evidence lay behind this new optimism. First, there was a critique 
of the deterministic neo-Marxist model of migration, which now seemed old- 
fashioned and illogical. The downward spiral of cumulative causation—for exam-
ple, underdevelopment produces migration, which leads to further underdevelopment 
and thus more migration—could not continue forever; and the accumulating evi-
dence of the migration hump—for instance, the way that the Southern European 
countries transitioned from mass emigration to mass immigration—was more con-
vincing. Moreover, an increasing body of empirical studies carried out at the time 
revealed that, under certain conditions, migration  could positively contribute to the 
development of regions and countries of origin, and that a more positive integration 
outcome often correlated with better home-country development feedbacks (De 
Haas  2010 , 240). Inspired by NELM thinking, migration came to be seen as an 
effective route out of poverty, and as a rational strategy for household sustenance 
and improvement. Remittances took centre stage in this M&D neo-optimism. 
Indeed, they became a kind of mantra for economists and policymakers working in 
this sector of development (Kapur  2005 ). Against the pessimists’ claim that remit-
tances were “wasted” on extravagant housing and social-status performances, stud-
ies traced productive and development-inducing effects (see Adams and Page  2005 ; 
Gammeltoft  2002 ; Lucas  2005 , 145–206; Ngoma and Ismail  2013 ). Remittance 
spending on housing and consumption, after all, did improve the quality of life and 
generate multiplier effects in the local economy, creating employment and 
 stimulating demand for goods and services. Improved housing not only raised social 
status, but also contributed to general wellbeing, health, and safety (De Haas  2012 , 
13). Once basic needs were met, some remittances were invested in farming, 
R. King and M. Collyer
177
small  enterprises, and services, especially in regions where such investments could 
bear fruit, such as agriculturally productive lands or areas undergoing tourism 
development. 
 The new optimism described above refl ects neoliberal ideas about individual ini-
tiative: the migrant is constituted as the key agent, even the hero, of development. 
Faist and Fauser ( 2011 , 7) draw parallels with the French policy notion  co- 
development , which positions the migrant as a partner in development cooperation. 
But it is also clear that the preferred type of migration has also changed, shifting 
back to an emphasis on temporary or circular migration—a return to the guest 
worker (Castles  2006 ) without, however, using that term. Circular migration is pre-
sented as the ideal type in order to maximize remittances and home-country com-
mitment, as well as (though this is rarely made explicit) to prevent long-term 
settlement and consequent “integration problems”. This shift in thinking about 
migration is currently receiving considerable academic attention (e.g., Ruhs  2006 ; 
Skeldon  2012 ) and has become enshrined in the terminology and policy thrusts of 
many prominent international policy actors. We cite three examples to make this 
point. The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), set up by UN 
Secretary-General Kofi  Annan, noted in its report, ‘the old paradigm of permanent 
migrant settlement is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration’ 
(GCIM  2005 , 31). The GCIM stressed ‘the need to grasp the developmental oppor-
tunities that this important shift in migration patterns provides for countries of ori-
gin’ and went on to encourage ‘countries of destination [to] promote circular 
migration by providing mechanisms and channels that enable migrants to move 
easily between their countries of origin and destination’. Second, successive vol-
umes of the IOM’s World Migration Report have likewise proposed that more cir-
cular migration can bring developmental benefi ts to developing countries (see, e.g., 
IOM  2008 ). Third, the UNDP’s  2009 Human Development Report paired “human 
mobility” and “development” in its subtitle and argued strongly for ‘overcoming the 
barriers’ to mobility, thereby releasing the potential for temporary migration to con-
tribute ‘large gains to human development’ (UNDP  2009 , 3). 
 These landmark statements by key international actors refl ect different variants 
of the so-called “triple-win” scenario whereby migration is said to be “good” for the 
receiving  and the sending countries, as well as for the migrants themselves. 
However, doubts about the attainability of the win-win-win situation lead us towards 
a more critical stance and a possible backswing of the pendulum towards a fourth 
stage, ‘neo-pessimism’ (De Haas  2012 , 22; Gamlen  2014 ), based on a two-pronged 
reappraisal of the optimistic view of M&D. First, empirical evidence on migrants’ 
real lives, either when they are working in exploitative conditions abroad, or from 
the perspective of their still-poor home communities, often reveals that the over- 
celebratory discourse of M&D is misplaced. The second reframing comes from 
questioning the ideology underlying the neoliberal agenda. Bronden ( 2012 , 3) sees 
the ‘positive’ M&D initiatives and policies discussed above as the ‘human face of 
neoliberalism’, masking more repressive agendas driven by the global North relat-
ing to migration control, securitization, and the necessity of preserving the  hegemony 
of the dominant economic and geopolitical powers. This encourages us to redirect 
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our gaze to the structural forces that are obscured by neoliberal rhetoric about 
migrants as the “best” agents for development—which for Glick Schiller ( 2012 , 93) 
is little more than ‘spin’. As Harvey ( 2005 ) among others shows, neoliberalism has 
created new wealth but only by destroying previous spatial structures and social 
relations of production, changing distribution and consumption patterns, and gener-
ating new forms of desire (see also Glick Schiller  2011 , 37). These transformations 
and translocations, whilst opening up new opportunities for migrants within seg-
mented, gendered, and sexualized fractions of the global labour market, have at the 
same time subjected many migrants to regimes of control, social exclusion, and 
denial of rights. Migrants’ vulnerability has been increased rather than reduced, as 
the latest economic crisis has demonstrated, especially in countries like Greece and 
Spain that have been harshly affected by fi nancial meltdown. 
 Towards a Broader Framing of Migration and Development 
 Over the past 20 or so years, two major paradigm shifts have affected the way we 
theorize and operationalize the concept of migration: these are the transnational 
perspective of the 1990s and the mobility turn of the 2000s, based respectively on 
foundational studies by Glick Schiller et al. ( 1992 ,  1995 ) and Urry ( 2000 ,  2007 ). 
Taken together, these opened up for study the transnational mobilities enfolded 
within longer term and more stable migration and integration systems—mobilities 
not only of people (e.g., visiting “home” or trading back and forth) but also of 
money, goods, ideas, and images, which circulate within, and indeed construct and 
constitute, transnational social and economic space (Faist  2008 ). Remittances 
remain a key part of the economics of transnational life (Guarnizo  2003 ), but they 
need to be understood in a wider context of, fi rst, transnational social, kinship, and 
gender dynamics, and second, state macroeconomic policy and institutional struc-
tures. Thanks to Levitt ( 1998 , 926), our understanding has broadened to include 
 social remittances: ‘the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that fl ow 
from receiving- to sending-country communities’ and which are dependent on the 
level of integration achieved by migrants in host countries. Subsequent thinking 
about social remittances has benefi ted from a yet broader light. Political and cultural 
remittances include ideas about democracy, entitlement, transparency, morality, and 
cultural codes that move not just from host to sending country but are circular, 
building on the social and cultural capital that migrants start out with before migra-
tion (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves  2011 ). 
 The transnational lens also creates the framework for adding a third M&D mech-
anism to return and remittances: the recent emphasis on “mobilizing the diaspora” 
for homeland development (Brinkerhoff  2008 ; Collyer  2013 ; Newland and Tanaka 
 2010 ; Sørensen  2007 ). Migrants and their descendants who are residentially based 
abroad can become geographically mobile “transnational agents” and “diasporic 
actors” stimulating development in homeland communities by setting up  businesses, 
investing in growth enterprises, and becoming politically or philanthropically active 
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(Faist and Fauser  2011 , 8). The issue of diaspora-led development is receiving 
increasing attention from home-country governments, international bodies, and 
donor agencies. Among the prescriptions for capitalizing on this development 
resource are the need to create an information-rich enabling environment that offers 
incentives for the diaspora to invest and “get involved” and the recommendation 
that homeland governments target certain segments or members of the diaspora who 
have the most to offer (Brinkerhoff  2009 ). Having said this, emigrants and diasporic 
people do not always have good relations with homeland authorities. There may be 
political cleavages and low levels of trust in the ability of governments to act trans-
parently and effi ciently. Therefore much diasporic activity in the homeland is indi-
vidualistic or administered through nongovernmental organizations. Nevertheless, 
diasporic actors have the capacity to move “beyond remittances” through their 
entrepreneurial activities, including investment, venture capital partnerships, and 
training and mentoring visits (Newland and Tanaka  2010 ). 
 Not only has the meaning of migration become stretched and diversifi ed, the 
same applies to understandings of development. The most recent trend is to look at 
development through a human wellbeing perspective. The IOM’s  2013 World 
Migration Report shifted the developmental focus onto the happiness and wellbeing 
of migrants and their family members. Gough and McGregor ( 2007 , 34) in their 
study of wellbeing in developing countries offer the following defi nition of human 
wellbeing: ‘a state of being with others, where human needs are met, where one can 
act meaningfully to pursue one’s goals and where one enjoys satisfactory quality of 
life’. A key distinction made in the literature is that between objective and subjec-
tive wellbeing (Wright  2012 , 9–11). The former concentrates on statistical indica-
tors of, for example, income, health, and employment, whereas the latter is based on 
subjective experience and evaluation, including both perceptions of the objective 
measures and culturally embedded meanings and understandings, for example, of 
what is a “nice” or “large” house. A review by the IOM of several studies reveals 
mixed results depending on context, but generally supports the view that migrants 
experience enhanced wellbeing compared to non-migrants (IOM  2013 , 114–170). 
 How Does the M&D Frame Relate to the Integration Process, 
and Vice Versa? 
 In this fi nal part of the chapter we link the discussion on M&D to the main theme of 
this book, integration. In doing so, we investigate a relationship between two areas 
of policy discussion—that on the integration of migrants in Europe and other 
advanced countries, and that on development in poor countries—that are usually 
kept separate. We also need to remind ourselves that integration is a multi-sphered 
process, including amongst others the legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural- 
religious realms, each of which contains various aspects, for example, housing, 
employment, education, voting rights, membership in ethnic organizations, and so 
on. We start by continuing the framing of migration within a transnational 
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perspective, as this allows us to consider migrants’ simultaneous acceptance as part 
of different social worlds—those of their origin and destination society and possibly, 
too, of a third, diasporic social space. From an integration perspective, two questions 
then arise. First, what is the relationship between migrants’ integration process, or 
their “state” of integration, in the host society, and the impact this has on their capac-
ity or willingness to instigate or participate in development in their countries, 
regions, and communities of origin? Second, for those who return migrate, how does 
the reintegration process proceed? This latter question has been little studied. 
 In their essay on African migrants in Europe, Grillo and Mazzucato ( 2008 ) argue 
that such migrants are “doubly engaged” in both places, “here” and “there”. It must 
be stressed that not all migrants lead transnational lives. Some eventually become 
assimilated and detached from their origin countries, while others, refugees, may 
not be able to engage with their homeland which, for them, may no longer exist as 
such. However, those who do live transnationally experience this double engage-
ment in three domains: material livelihoods, family relations, and socio-cultural 
identity (Grillo and Mazzucato  2008 , 185–191). In her more detailed study of 
Ghanaian migrants based in the Netherlands, Mazzucato ( 2008 ) shows that they are 
active in the labour market and participate in the Dutch economy at the neighbour-
hood, city, and national levels. At the same time, and more importantly for them, 
they invest back in Ghana in housing, businesses, and family members’ wellbeing 
and education, including donations to funerals. They are thus economically (as well 
as socially and culturally) integrated in both places. In one sense this is a zero-sum 
relationship: economic resources invested in the Netherlands, for instance, on 
accommodation, living costs, and consumer goods, cannot be deployed in Ghana. 
On the other hand, there is also a positive synergy in that the more economically 
successful a migrant is in the Netherlands, the more resources are generated for 
“development” back home. This leads us directly to a more formal theoretical and 
empirical examination of the key question: How does “integration” impact on 
home-country development? 
 One interesting framework for answering this question is Cerase’s ( 1974 ) model 
of the relationship between integration and return migration. Based on a case study 
of Italian return migration from the USA in the early post-war decades (243 return-
ees were interviewed in various parts of Italy), Cerase tried to demonstrate that the 
impact of return was dependent on the time spent abroad and, in particular, on the 
stage of the integration process that the migrant had reached at the time when the 
return took place. The author proposed a model with four outcome phases. The fi rst 
phase is when the migrant fails to adjust to the new society (integration is thus mini-
mal) and return takes place after a very short time (within a year or so). Upon return, 
such migrants are absorbed as if they had never left. Cerase calls this the  return of 
failure and posits that this has no impact on development. In phase two, the immi-
grant stays abroad longer, but remains oriented towards the homeland and the notion 
of return there. Some integration in US society takes place, but not much. This type 
of returnee has their sights fi xed on a return to the old ways, but with an improved 
socio-economic status due to the ability to purchase agricultural land or to build a 
new house. Whilst some new attitudes and behaviours have been absorbed from the 
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USA, such as a greater respect for social justice and a more open and informal 
 mentality, the developmental effects of this kind of return remain limited. This is 
termed the  return of conservatism . For those who remain abroad yet longer, the 
integration process becomes more advanced and migrants become increasingly 
attuned to US society and its ways of life and values. This also diminishes the likeli-
hood of return, but for those who do go back, the potential for real developmental 
impact is greater. This third phase, the  return of innovation , brings new ideas, ener-
gies, and business practices which, provided there is fertile terrain for their applica-
tion in the homeland context, can indeed stimulate development. Such returnees are, 
however, a minority in the overall return-migrant population, and their desire and 
potential for change are often stifl ed by the entrenched power of local non-migrant 
elites. The fi nal stage of return is that of  retirement , when well-integrated migrants 
feel the pull of nostalgia at the end of their working lives; but, being economically 
inactive, their developmental impact is limited. 
 Although the Cerase model is intuitively attractive and logical, and has been 
much cited, its limitations are obvious. Its interpretation of development is largely 
“economic modernization”, and it reduces integration to a one-dimensional linear 
process. A more robust and nuanced conceptualization of integration is developed 
in studies that statistically model various dimensions of integration according to a 
variety of transnational orientations towards the home country including remittance- 
sending, paying regular visits, and attitudes towards return migration (see Cela et al. 
 2013 ; De Haas and Fokkema  2011 ; Fokkema et al.  2013 ). What these studies tend 
to demonstrate is that migrants who are  economically well integrated in the host 
country are more likely to have meaningful transnational engagement with their 
origin-country society, including sending remittances and other actions with posi-
tive developmental outcomes, such as business investment. On the other hand, 
migrants who are  socio-culturally well integrated are more likely to become 
detached from their home country and therefore less actively involved in transna-
tional activities that might lead to development. This contrasting correlation—posi-
tive between economic integration, transnationalism, and development and negative 
for socio-cultural integration’s impact—seems to hold for both fi rst- and second- 
generation migrants, according to the studies cited above, which are based on a 
variety of migrant groups in different countries. 6 Alongside these quantitative anal-
yses are studies that take a more intuitive approach. Erdal and Oeppen ( 2013 ) 
describe the relationship between integration and transnationalism as a “balancing 
act” whereby the migrant straddles two societies. Reviewing the literature, Erdal 
and Oeppen ( 2013 , 875) fi nd that outcomes are highly context-specifi c, depending 
on place, type of migration, and within the same migration system, also varying 
over time (see also Snel et al.  2006 ). One issue with Erdal and Oeppen’s analysis, 
6  To be specifi c, Cela et al. ( 2013 ) look at Eastern Europeans (Poles, Ukrainians, Moldovans, 
Romanians, and Albanians) in Italy; De Haas and Fokkema ( 2011 ) study African migrants in 
Southern Europe (Moroccans and Senegalese in Spain, Egyptians and Ghanaians in Italy); whilst 
Fokkema et al. ( 2013 ) examine the remittance behaviour of second-generation Turks, Moroccans, 
and people of Yugoslav heritage in several European cities. 
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and with other studies that examine the integration–transnationalism interface, is 
the extent to which transnationalism equates to “development” of the origin society. 
Where remittances and investments are involved, the link is fairly clear (albeit 
dependent on how these fi nancial fl ows are utilized), but given that some authors 
(Levitt and Glick Schiller  2004 ; Vertovec  1999 ) view transnationalism as both 
“ways of being” and “ways of belonging”, the developmental aspect is less 
obvious. 
 The fact remains that further research is sorely needed on the relationship 
between integration (and its multifaceted elements) and engagement in home- 
country development. Shifting understandings of what integration actually is, and 
what policies should be applied along the spectrum from multiculturalism to assimi-
lation, serve only to complicate the M&D relationship. Critics of multiculturalism 
argue that it has proven detrimental to economic integration, leading instead to cul-
tural and religious separatism, which threatens national identity. The widespread 
view that multiculturalism has somehow “failed” leads many countries to adopt 
more assimilationist-oriented policies towards immigrants. What implications this 
has for the developmental potential of migration is not clear. There is the argument, 
advanced by Castles et al. ( 2014 , 80):
 [I]mmigrant-receiving governments can increase the developmental potential of migration 
by lowering the thresholds for immigration… and through favouring the socioeconomic 
integration of migrants by countering discrimination and racism on the labour market and 
giving them access to housing and education as well as residency and (dual) citizenship 
rights. 
 Yet, as we also noted, recent trends towards more demand-driven temporary and 
circular migration ignore the integration dimension and do nothing to foster long- 
term settlement rights. 
 The fi nal question addressed in this chapter concerns the phenomenon of 
migrants’  reintegration in their home countries, and the developmental context of 
this process. This question was broached early on in the return–development debate 
(see, e.g., Van Gendt  1977 ) but, to the best of our knowledge, it has never been 
thoroughly investigated, neither at the theoretical nor at the empirical level. 7 
Theoretically, the key questions would seem to be the following: Does integration 
into the immigration country’s host society imply a process of “de-integration” 
from the home-country society? Is gradual re-acceptance as part of the (home) soci-
ety contingent on a gradual loss of acceptance in the former destination? Or does the 
opposite apply, namely, that the personal skills and social and human capital 
required for rapid and successful acceptance as part of a new host society are also 
effective in enabling a smooth reintegration upon return? Early sociological studies 
of return migration—for example, by Saloutos ( 1956 ) on returning Greek-Americans 
and Lopreato ( 1967 ) on the impact of return migration on a South Italian village—
tend to show that long-absent migrants face diffi culties in reintegrating back home. 
7  Indicative of this lacuna is the recent Metropolis public seminar Migrant Reintegration and 
Homeland Development, Ottowa, 14 March 2014, designed to ‘discuss the development potential 
offered by the continuum of migrant integration, return, and reintegration into the homeland’. 
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At best they formed a  nouveau riche group interposed between the traditional elites 
and the peasant or working class from which they had been drawn. Local people 
often viewed them with a mixture of suspicion and jealousy. But these studies are 
from an earlier era of long-distance migration, when the socio-economic and cul-
tural divide between sending and receiving countries constituted a wider time–space 
gap. Nowadays, with many migrants engaged in more intense transnational circuits 
of personal travel, fi nancial fl ows, and other transactions, as well as the globaliza-
tion of information and cultural codes, the outcome is likely to be different. However, 
the wealth of theoretical concepts and analytical tools that have been applied to 
study the process of migrant integration in Europe and elsewhere has yet to be 
turned to the study of return migrants’ reintegration. Here is a major empirical chal-
lenge for migration studies scholars working in a developmental context. 
 Conclusion 
 Researchers, analysts, and policymakers continue to struggle in comprehending the 
nature of the multiple relationships between migration, development, and integra-
tion. As we have seen, at least three obstacles stand in the way of a mature and 
nuanced understanding: problems of defi nition and measurement of all three phe-
nomena; ideological positions that are impossible to reconcile; and the confl icting 
and hence inconclusive nature of the empirical evidence, too much of which is 
based on narrowly defi ned case studies. The way forward is not easy to identify. 
Migration, (under)development, and (non-)integration are all “facts of global life”, 
which are not easily managed towards desired positive outcomes, except perhaps at 
a fairly local level. Individual linkages, for instance, between emigration and home- 
country development or between different models of integration and willingness to 
invest time and resources in developing hometown communities, are diffi cult to 
isolate within the matrix of collateral processes such as economic cycles, different 
and dynamic host-country politics, and the new post-9/11 security environment. 
The mid-2014 round of European and local elections, furthermore, was marked by 
a sharp rise in voters’ support for anti-immigration parties in some countries (par-
ticularly the UK, France, and Greece). In an increasingly xenophobic climate, rhet-
oric obscures analysis, and migration’s potential contribution to home-country 
development is pushed to the background. 
 Proponents of the virtuous-circle view of M&D thus fi nd themselves squeezed 
between those who call ever-louder for migration control and those who criticize 
the entire edifi ce of the M&D nexus in the neoliberal era and are moving the pendu-
lum towards its fourth, neo-pessimistic swing (Delgado Wise and Márquez 
Covarrubias  2011 ; Gamlen  2014 ; Kunz  2008 ; Page and Mercer  2012 ; Raghuram 
 2009 ). A key question thus becomes how to stop the pendulum swinging. An obvi-
ous answer is to move towards a more rigorous evaluation of existing research 
 evidence, downgrading the signifi cance of small-scale case studies and privileging 
larger scale and especially comparative studies. Even so, challenges remain, given 
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the diversity of types of migration (e.g., short and long term, high and low skilled) 
and of historical and geographical contexts. Undoubtedly, there is more scope for 
analysis of global-scale socio-economic datasets and migration variables related to 
development outcomes (e.g., Czaika  2013 ; Ngoma and Ismail  2013 ; Sanderson 
 2013 ) and perhaps also of socio-economic and legal-political integration variables. 
 The way forward is also for more collaboration and cross-fertilization to take 
place across three main areas of scholarship and policymaking that hitherto have not 
spoken much to each other: those who study migration as a process of transnational 
movement; those who study development; and those who study integration and 
social cohesion. This conversation needs to take place across disciplines, between 
those with research and policy experience in different parts of the world, and at 
multiple scales of analysis, from the global down through the regional (such as the 
EU), to countries, cities, communities, and households.
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